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Background: Research Ethics Committees (RECs) or their equivalent review applications for prospective 
research with human participants. Reviewers use universally agreed principles 1  to make decisions about 
whether prospective health and social care research is ethical. Close attention to understanding how reviewers 
go about their decision-making work and consider principles in practice, is limited. 
Objective: The study aimed to understand how reviewers made decisions in the contexts of meetings and to 
understand more about how reviewers approach their work. The purpose of this article is to draw on data and 
findings and to show how Reflective Equilibrium (RE) as a theoretical frame can (1) deepen understanding of 
ethics review; and, (2) permit a reflexive examination of the habitual processes of review. 
Design and participants: Methods captured the day to day work of the RECs.  Seventeen applications were 
heard during 8 observations. There were 12 formal interviews with reviewers (n=12) and with researchers 
(n=8) which are not reported on in this article. 
 Ethical considerations: Organisational approval for the study was given by X whose functions became part of 
XX during the study. The study was given favourable opinion by the University of Salford’s Research Ethics 
Committee (Reference HSR11/17). 
Findings: Data were analysed using constructed grounded theory resulting in eight themes which revealed 
attention to procedure and engagement with applications.  RE was used as a qualitative frame to interpret 
themes distilling them into three processes at work in review: emotion and intuition; imagination and creative 
thinking; intuition and trust.  
Discussion: Reviewers went back and forth between universal principles, considered these in the contexts of 
each application using the above processes.  
Conclusions: RE offers a coherent and grounded account of review work. Reflexivity in training for reviewers is 
essential for improving practices. The challenges reflexivity presents can be assisted by using RE as a tool to 
illuminate tacit review processes. 
 













National Health Service (NHS) Research Ethics Committees (RECs) in England are authoritative bodies. They 
function as the institutional mechanism through which society exercises jurisdiction over what kinds of research 
are ethical.  This article draws on empirical research 
carried out with RECs. It uses examples from observations and interviews to show how reviewers apply principles 
in practice and tacitly use Reflective Equilibrium (henceforth, RE) as a way of arriving at balanced decisions. RE 
as method can be used as a means of reflective consideration of ethical and moral questions and has previously 
been proposed as a way of enhancing professionals’ ethical education [1].  Reviewers use RE implicitly. None of 
the reviewers interviewed described their work in these terms, however, analysis of data derived from 
observations and interviews showed that reviewers do use RE in the practice of ethics review and it closely 
describes their work.  In this article, the claim is that RE is tacitly used by reviewers, it describes the work of 
ethics review and the RE frame may helpfully be utilised for reviewers to understand better how they reach 
decisions. That is, an RE frame has the potential to both describe, illuminate and enhance reviewers’ reflexive 
capacity to enable them to access the tacit processes they use in reaching decisions.   
 
 Ethical principles are formalised and codified through highly developed procedural systems.  RECs or their 
equivalent (for example, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in the United States US) review applications for 
prospective research to assess whether the proposed research is ethical or not. A In the UK, RECs function as 
the committees where decisions about the suitability of research are made. Given their significant regulatory 
function, critique has been inevitable though close attention to understanding how reviewers go about their 
work is limited. Reviewers on committees do this in a formal sense through checking whether applications and 
researchers comply with universally agreed principles which are operationalised in the form of digital 
applications in required consent forms, participant information sheets and in general statements about ethical 
conduct in research. In practice, reviewers used a range of tacit strategies to reach decisions. Tacit knowledge 
describes hidden assumptions and meanings transcending the immediate surface and yet guiding actions 
whether individuals explicitly say so or not [2]. Reviewers balanced principles and tacit processes to reach 
decisions. 
Rawls [3] in a Theory of Justice described RE as a method of bringing into balance considered principles, 
judgements and theories into a state of harmony. This is “reached after a person has weighed various proposed 
conceptions” [4 p43].  Rawls developed and refined the meaning of RE  but  the term has wide application and 
is used in bioethics and clinical ethics broadly as a way of thinking through moral questions,  a method of 
reflection for moral problems [5].‘Wide’ RE (which Rawls referred to following his original discussion) 
incorporates a ‘wide’ scope of judgements, principles, rules, moral beliefs and intuitions to reach a balanced 
assessment of a problem. RE has been recognised as a useful concept for bioethics because accounts from ‘the 





resonance for ethics review where decisions are reached by reviewers going back and forth between rules 
(principles and procedure) and particular cases (applications for review). The lens of RE was then utilised in 
analysis as a descriptive frame which provided a credible explanation of what was happening in review work. 
This retrospective analysis is useful on two counts. First, it describes closely the effort and work which goes into 
reviewers’ deliberations. Second, the description of REC work as RE offers potential for learning and improving 
ethics review.   
 
The reach of ethics committees 
There is no escaping ethical review by an appropriate committee for most research conducted with human 
participants. This includes virtually all research conducted in the UK, North America and European countries [7]. 
There is global concern with ethical conduct in research. The World Health Organisation (WHO) proposes that 
all research with human beings should be reviewed by an ethics committee to ensure ethical standards are 
maintained and there is published guidance for the establishment and conduct of such committees [8]. The 
Belmont Report (1979) recognised the complexity of ethical situations and the difficulties in interpreting rules 
embedding a broader principles approach as a basis for rules to be devised, criticized and interpreted. [9]. 
The foundations for ethical conduct in clinical practice and research are underpinned by the deontological 
approach usually summarised in the four principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013; Beauchamp, 2007) [6, 10]. Principles are formalised and codified through 
highly developed procedural systems with RECs or their equivalent (for example, Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs) in the US) acting for larger institutions as arbiters of what constitutes ethical research.  
In the United Kingdom, the Health Research Authority (HRA) established in December 2011 aimed to promote 
and protect the interests of patients in health research and streamline the regulation of research. The most 
recent iteration of principles can be found in the framework for health and social care research. [11] (HRA, 
2017). This far-reaching document incorporates core principles but in all outlines nineteen points which act as 
a benchmark that research is expected to meet. The HRA’s brief includes responsibility for overseeing research 
in health and social care. RECs are charged with the review of applications for research which involve human 
research participants. Their work is broadly summarised as reviewing applications for research and providing 
‘opinions’ about the proposed participant involvement and whether the research is ethical. 
Researchers in the UK are encouraged to attend REC meetings. The outcome decisions available to each REC are 
categorised as opinions and are currently: ‘Favourable opinion’ (usually with conditions); ‘Unfavourable 
opinion’;  ‘Provisional opinion’ (with request for further information);  ‘Provisional opinion’ (pending 
consultation with a referee); or, ‘no opinion’[12]. 
 
 





RECs can in effect veto research with consequences for the creation of knowledge to support improvement and 
development of practice in health and social care fields. Formal review has therefore unsurprisingly been subject 
to extensive critique. 
 
Criticisms  of formal ethics review (and oversight committees generally) are with the idiosyncratic nature of 
decision-making [13] and concern with the role of ethical principles in ethics review which are utilised as 
‘prescriptions’ for, and ‘proscriptions’ required of, researchers [14]. Dissatisfaction with committees’ decision-
making cannot simply be explained away as a by-product of researchers’ disappointing personal experiences.  
However, reviewers occupy a liminal space. In reaching a decision they are considering both researchers’ desire 
to conduct research to produce knowledge and the rights of the researched to be protected in that process.  
Decisions are made by and between reviewers in the context of committee meetings. Thus charges of 
idiosyncratic decision-making and the use of principles to delimit research need to be based on what happens 
at meetings and what reviewers say about their work not just the resulting decisions. 
 
 Two types of criticism have been delineated by Sheehan [15]. First, criticism of the shortcomings of the 
governance system and how it functions (these can be summarised as over-bureaucratisation, inconsistency, 
relevance for qualitative research, ineffectiveness) and the second, a theoretical critique which questions the 
need for RECs at all. Sheehan goes on to argue that critique requires evidence which is not always apparent in 
the arguments for change. Furthermore, attention would first need to be paid to whether the current system 
can evolve and develop in response to any existing problems. Apart from a few notable exceptions 
[16,17,18,19,20,21] both criticisms and suggestions for enhancement or development of RECs are not grounded 
in the work that is carried out. Limited attention is paid to the ways in which review work could improve though 
there has been some recent debate about how committees should develop. Such debate has argued either that 
RECs should focus on consistency in the use of formal codes.[22] or whether reviewers’ ethical reflection and 
deliberation should be extended and improved [23]. Other commentators have called for a professionalisation 
of RECs precisely because their role goes beyond checking for adherence to codes but importantly involves 
making judgements about the science, methodology and even research teams when they consider applications 
[24].  
 
While this critical commentary has spotlighted some of the challenges for the national framework of ethics in 
health research and raises important issues that require redress, ideas and recommendations are predominantly 
not grounded in empirical data. In other words, there is a limited evidence base in terms of what reviewers do 
in meetings, on how work is accomplished, and decisions made.  Critique does not generally engage with the 
language and concepts used by reviewers [25] including how they use gut feelings. Even in studies utilising 
established quantitative frameworks to ‘measure’ performance and adherence to procedure this shortcoming 
there is acknowledgement of the scant data on the working of RECs globally ‘what they do and why they do 
what they do.’ [26 p. 43]. A focus on work – in the settings of meetings and what reviewers say they do – is 





Here RE offers a helpful way of both describing and theorising about review work and, a potential way in which 
reviewers could examine what they do and how they do it thereby developing their reflective ability. 
 
RE in review work 
  Rawls described the two elements of the term RE. ‘Equilibrium’ because principles and judgements coincide 
and ‘reflective’ because ‘we know to what principles our judgements conform…’. [3 p.18]. For Rawls, RE as a 
method involved a back and forth activity where we constantly adjust judgements, matching these to ‘cases’, 
pruning judgements so that these along with other beliefs to reach a decision that is coherent. As a method RE 
is a reflective means of adjusting broad principles to render them coherent in the context of cases. Translating 
this for review work, RE is the consideration of how overarching principles need to be altered and applied to 
proposed research and in relation to other overarching principles. 
 
RE has flaws as a method. It describes how judgements are based on intuitions and what we feel is morally 
acceptable. Such judgements are contextualised, shaped by social and cultural norms. Nevertheless, RE is used 
here to reveal the dynamic nature of review work and how crucial decisions are made in RECs.  Rawls 
acknowledged that RE as a method was not to discover moral ‘truth’ but was a descriptive project which enabled 
a better understanding of the moral sensibilities we have. [27]. The RE frame describes what illuminates the 
processes of decision-making in RECs and as it is a reflective method, holds potential for revealing some of the 





The data reported on in this article was collected during the course of an institutional ethnographic study using 
methods which captured the day to day work of the REC as sites where review happens, and decisions are made 
about whether research is ethical or not. Implicit in the focus on day to day work of organisations and the 
‘mundane’ is recognition that knowledge can be generated about institutions and the ways in which their work 
is tied together and co-ordinated. This can lead to findings of wider social significance as well as illuminating 
practices for people working within them. [28, 29]. (Smith, 1999:2006). 
Setting and participants 
NHS RECs consist of up to 18 members, 1/3rd of whom are lay (broadly, this means their main professional 
interest is not in a research area, nor are they a registered healthcare professional). Their work is voluntary. 
Reviewers began meetings by having a general discussion about the application under review led by two 
reviewers who had been tasked with a close reading.  The Chair collated questions and queries for the researcher 
who would come in following the preliminary discussion. Following the discussion with the researcher, an 







Organisational approval for the study was given by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) whose functions 
became part of the HRA during the study. They had oversight of the study design and advised on consent 
arrangements.  
Consent was initially negotiated directly with the Chairs of RECs who sought individual (reviewers) and 
committee consent for the research. This allowed reviewers to consider whether they wanted to be involved 
prior to formal consent being taken. Participant Information Sheets were provided to individual panel members 
at observation and interview stages. These explained that the purpose of the research was to investigate how 
reviewers debated and thought about applications and how they arrived at decisions about ethical research with 
vulnerable people. debated and thought about applications and how they arrived at decisions about ethical 
research with people who are considered vulnerable. Information provided aligned to the methodological 
foundation of the study which was to explore how applications were conceptualised (thought about and 




Their decisions were communicated to me via the national co-ordinator. Not all RECs consented. Individual 
consent was again sought for interviews.  
Data collection 
Observations took place over a period of 18 months and typically lasted between 1-3 hours. Close field-notes 
were taken as audio recording was not permitted. Observations at meetings allowed access to the practical work 
of ethics review – paying attention to reviewers’ deliberations in situ. Follow – up interviews permitted insights 
into the reviewers’ own interpretation and understanding of what their work was about. Through observations 
and interviews with reviewers, data were gathered on the everyday of review work and reviewers’ perceptions 
of what they did.  
Seventeen applications were heard during 8 observations. There were 12 formal interviews with reviewers 
(n=12) and with researchers (n=8) (not reported on in this article). 
Data analysis 
Analysis 
Descriptive codes were constructed using a grounded theory approach [30] (Charmaz, 2014). Grounded theory 
views coding as ‘constructed’ because it reflects the views of the researcher, reflecting subjective choices about 
what is seen as significant and using the researcher’s choice of words (p115). To this extent the analysis adopted 
a grounded theory approach. 
Theorising from the data led to a description of work which encompassed objective and subjective processes. 
The use of institutional texts was a strong feature and is reported elsewhere [ 35]. Having discovered that RE 





as a qualitative post-hoc frame of analysis, as a theoretical lens to tell the story of what happens in ethics review. 
It is not intended to provide a complete, definitive understanding of the work of RECs, however. RE illuminates 
processes at meetings potentially providing insights for reviewers in assisting a reflexive approach to their work 
as well as helping researchers to understand how reviewers work to reach decisions in a largely reflective 
manner moving between  regulations and intuitions to reach a reasonable judgement. 
The descriptive codes and how they illustrate features of RE are shown in figure 1. A focus on the ‘bottom up’ 
features of RE resulted in the identification of three forms of tacit process. 
 
Findings 
The tacit ways reviewers reached decisions were by using ‘emotion and intuition’; ‘imagination and 
creative thinking’; and, ‘intuition and trust’, balancing these with principles. In practice, they referred to 
universal principles and procedure, but they did more than simply check adherence to these. They also 
focussed on the sensitivities presented in each application. The data extracts illustrate this back and forth 
process. 
Figure 1: Themes and congruence with features of RE 
 
Reviewers are making crucial judgements about whether applications measure up to legal and procedural 
requirements and the ethical imperatives of autonomy, beneficence and justice. However, principles are only 
put to work through a range of other forms of engagement with the applications under review. 
Emotion and intuition 
Themes of engaging with design, moral reflection and concern with good research were ways in which reviewers 
brought meaning to ethical principles in the context of the applications considered. 
 For Rawls, ‘considered judgements’ may be judgements which we all may broadly agree on, such as protection 
of research participants from harm but this may not be an absolute principle when we consider possible conflicts 
in the contexts of particular cases. The challenges are the tensions in what constitutes harm, and this differs 
according to context.  This was illustrated by a reviewer during interview questioned her/himself about harm in 
research using the example of blood tests. S/he said: 
If we’re taking blood samples from babies, then the baby screams – there is distress to the baby and the mother 
(sic) parent) so we have to question how many times we can take blood. What is reasonable? Clinicians (as 
researchers) may treat these situations in the same way even when in one case the blood tests might be for 
treatment and in another, for research. What if it’s not to do with treatment – it’s not clinical judgement but 





The challenge is the tension regarding what constitutes harm. The broad principle (which according to Rawls, 
our intuitions are based on) can be agreed but the conceptualisation in the context of specific cases is difficult. 
How this is balanced against other principles (as in the next example) is a further thorny issue in ethics review.  
Reviewers had to decide on what was reasonable harm or burden was in an application considering a novel 
form of communication for people with dementia. The researcher was a postgraduate student. Following the 
observation, I discussed the decision with one of the lead reviewers. The committee had struggled with the 
principles of beneficence and non-maleficence because they felt it was unlikely that any startling advances 
could be made for this community of participants. The procedural requirements were a concern here because 
in the UK, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) [31] requires that to involve participants who lack 
capacity to consent, research must have the potential to benefit the participant or be intended to provide 
knowledge of causes or treatment of the care of persons affected by a similar or the same condition 
Another reviewer said that s/he began with quality of research, ‘for example, are there well-defined objects, how 
will outcomes be managed. Most people are not evil who are doing research’. 
And on vulnerability, ‘well there are certain categories like children or people with mental problems. ……. As a 
community we have a responsibility not to authorize a study if it is only for the sake of achieving a higher degree. 
Research involves human beings. It sounds pompous, but it is our duty. People with dementia for example, we 
have to do our utmost to ensure that they are not used for something that is not worthwhile. Design is not our 
concern however bad research or bad science is not ethical. 
 
This balancing of harm and benefit, the weighing up of universally accepted principles where risk-benefit 
relations are conceived ‘in terms of a ratio between the probability and magnitude of an anticipated harm.’ [6 
p.230] is an everyday part of review work.  Reviewers do this using emotional engagement, thinking themselves 
into the research in order to decide. The reviewer concluded that, ‘(the researcher) wanted to get the best form 
of reaction they could when using this new form of communication. Whether people were more settled, whether 
they smiled. People can be very isolated. There may be processes going on that we don’t know. It’s a great 
sadness’.  
This kind of reflection drawing on feeling and emotion shaped review work. The specific role of emotion is not 
highly developed in RE but may be viewed as part of the intuitions and gut-feelings that are deployed in reaching 
a balanced view of a problem. Emotions play a part in decision-making with emotions shaping reactions and 
ultimate decisions.  
 
Imagination and creative thinking 
Another way in which reviewers engaged with design was through imagining the implications of research. 
Imagining themselves into the research was a way of resolving the inevitable tensions when applying principles. 
A reviewer who described her/himself as a lay member, was reflecting on a study which had proposed to trial a 






‘The REC guidelines are difficult to keep in mind - I'm a lay member. I try to keep in mind what could go wrong 
for the patient, I try to be creative in my own mind and (I) asked the question what's the worst that can happen? 
In this study if I was incapacitated would I want this to happen? And if I would want it, are there other reasons 
why someone would not. My gut reaction is – is this okay?’ 
 
Gillam et al [32] used the term ‘imaginative identification’ (p.7.7) to describe a common approach taken by 
reviewers where they imagine a close family member or themselves as participants in research under review. 
This is described as a non-abstract way of considering risks, disadvantages and possible benefits. It is another 
tacit technique used in reaching equilibrium between the reviewers’ concerns or unease about research and 
resolving the tension in order to be satisfied that ethical principles of harm and benefit are being met. Principle-
informed procedures are amenable to a variety of interpretations. Codes are ‘inescapably normative concepts 
requiring normative knowledge, reflection and interpretation.’ [23 p.491]. Using emotion to connect with the 
perspectives of participants and their carers is a way of making principles come to life.   
 
An application which potentially included people who may lack capacity illustrated how reviewers engaged with 
the principle of fairness. The study proposed concerned the incidence of co-morbidities in patients admitted to 
hospital with heart conditions. The range of symptoms to be captured included mental and physical health 
conditions. Some participants were likely to have fluctuating capacity or permanent cognitive impairments. The 
concerns of the committee were with both the legal requirement in the MCA 2005 (S31-33 ) [31](that the study 
could not take place without the inclusion of those lacking capacity) and the principle of justice which can be 
understood here as ‘fairness’ or wanting to support the involvement of everybody in research. The discussion 
went as follows: 
 
Reviewer 1: how would the study be affected if you didn’t include people who lacked capacity? 
Researcher: Impairment is frequent in admissions and so this would cause the data to be biased. Some 
people admitted to the heart unit have dementia for example. 
Reviewer 2: Well some patients might be confused but that would be temporary so you could go back 
to those patients. Can’t you exclude people with long term impairments? 
Researcher: I don’t want to do this. Some people will have cognitive impairments. 
Reviewer 3: (appealing to other reviewers) I struggle with this. If I compare this to my area, learning 
disability, I’d want to be encouraging about inclusion. People can communicate emotions such as pain 
and so on. 
Researcher: I don’t want to exclude people on that basis. They may well be able to describe their 
symptoms, but they may not be able to consent to research. I could have excluded people (who can’t 







When the researcher left the discussion turned to shortcomings in relation to the consent documentation. The 
debate between reviewers balanced the ‘flawed’ application with the importance of including participants who 
could not consent in the research in order to pursue knowledge. 
 
S/he wants to include (this group of people) in the pursuit of knowledge so why should we stand in her 
way? 
It’s flawed but maybe it’s as good as it can be. 
 
Here, in order to make a judgement, reviewers were faced with the problem of an application which had not 
fully addressed the principle of autonomy (operationalised as consent requirements) and so was procedurally 
inadequate.   The reviewers took a view that that people should be included in the research even if it is harder 
to negotiate their consent or legally seek consent by proxy (through a consultee). The discussion encompassed 
their moral sensitivities, intuitions and the squaring of these with the imperative for adherence to principle and 
procedure, specifically, principles of justice and autonomy. Reviewers’ deliberations operated at different levels 
of abstraction, some abstract, some concrete. Again, RE offers an insightful way of understanding these 
discussions as it describes a process which pays attention to moral and non-moral beliefs at different levels of 
reflection and abstraction such as intuition, moral rules or principles and abstract theories [5].   
Resulting decisions in review following debate are not objective but a result of using individual judgements, gut 
feelings which give definition to overarching principles. Reviewers would be unable to arrive at a coherent 
position without finding an equilibrium between the abstract principles and their gut/intuitive reactions to the 
concrete case under review. Reviewers use creativity in thinking about cases. Discourses of objectivity and 
consistency may appeal but creative thinking, curiosity and reflection in the context of the research proposed 
are required in order to make decisions. The final example shows how trust and trustworthiness were also part 
of decision-making. 
 
Intuition and trust 
Reviewers use what is available to them to make the best judgement calls on research. Procedure could be 
trumped for example by estimations of trust and trustworthiness. One reviewer talked about the role of trust in 




It’s not to do with their moral life but when they come in, what they show. Are they trustworthy, do they 
have integrity and an understanding of what they are doing? It’s kind of subjective - but not. (It’s) the 





So, (we’re) not bogged down with minutiae – (we are) willing to trust. It (the minutiae) becomes 
important if we’re not able to trust. 
 
Stark [19] described how reviewers in IRBs in the US assessed researcher trustworthiness by reviewing the 
submitted documents. For example, researchers who had submitted a ‘tidy’ document using the correct 
language were more likely to be positively appraised. Estimations of trustworthiness are different in the UK 
because researchers are encouraged to attend meetings. Appraisal of the researcher is not solely based on the 
quality of submitted documents which happens at IRBs in the US. Reviewers comment on the documents and 
whether consent forms  comply with regulations and use the required language but reviewers are prepared to 
step outside of that limited approach to appraisal. Appraisal becomes another part of the deliberation using 
intuition and based on the face to face interaction (Are researchers modest? Do they acknowledge mistakes?) 
with the researcher. Thus the researcher’s attendance and resulting researcher/reviewer exchange provides an 
additional layer of information (besides the application) on which reviewers can reflect. This becomes part of 
working up to a moral case for approving research so that the end decision, though usually contingent, has been 
reached through a process of balancing procedure (the ‘minutiae’) with feelings and intuitions about the 
application and researcher.  
Procedures are where ethical principles are operationalised and distilled into required forms. Reviewers directly 
pursued concerns about omissions in the application. One reviewer talked about how it was possible to ‘lead’ 
the researcher into providing the ‘correct’ responses or responses which would lead to a favourable opinion. 
S/he described how: ‘The onus is on the researcher to make the case, but I don’t know if you noticed but we fed 
her (the researcher) the lines. We have to draw out the bits to satisfy the legal requirements. We’re teasing bits 
out to satisfy ourselves. It makes it easier. The hurdles are low. If you use the (correct) language, you can pass’ 
 
This reviewer’s comments seem to suggest that both parties (reviewers and researchers) engage in a kind of 
regulatory dance. Ethical principles are not fixed but abstract and open to interpretation. Procedure and 
regulation are institutional ways of fixing principles. Nevertheless, principles require interpretation in particular 
contexts. In review, this interpretation of principles happens in the debate about the application, the description 
of prospective research and the researcher. Where reviewers decided that research adhered (broadly) to 
principles but not to the letter of the regulatory requirements, they sought out the required language. 
Ultimately, procedure must be adhered to and decision letters sent. Just as the REC post-meeting letters to 
researchers are the result of a need for a single authoritative ruling on the ethics of an application [33]), the 
meeting itself has to conclude with a definitive and recognisable decision which can be translated into a script 
of requirements. These concern the ‘correct language ‘and ‘the correct lines’ which are needed from the 





To conclude, findings have shown that reviewers balance their responses to applications (intuition, emotion, 
imagination) with overarching principles and procedure in their deliberations, moving between the universal 
and the particular to reach a decision. 
 
Discussion  
The practical imperative of reaching a decision in ethics review can be explained using RE as a conceptual frame. 
This approach has illuminated how principles and procedure are apparent in review work but that these 
constantly interact with reviewers’ own ways of making sense of research.   In wide RE, coherence or holism is 
achieved through reasoning ‘back and forth between judgments about cases, moral principles, and non-moral 
background theories, without giving epistemic priority to any of these elements of the method.’ [34 p. 328]. (The 
back and forth in ethics review are between instinct, personal intuition about researchers, empathy, emotional 
engagement and imagination. Decisions are the outcome of consideration of a range of moral and non-moral 
feelings . Principle informed   procedure has an important role in that review work uses procedural texts to make 
decisions appear rational and neutral [35]. Nevertheless, the practical, emotional and subjective factors involved 
in decision-making go beyond the strictures of formal procedure. Much of review work is about finding 
coherence between these disparate elements, finding a warranted solution to a practical moral problem is 
reached by questioning ‘the tenability and relevance of all sorts of beliefs, none of which is immune to revision’ 
[5 p.207]. Nevertheless, these processes are tacit. They are not obvious or amenable to scrutiny. They are the 
practical ways decisions are made but are not available for reflexive learning. 
The potential of RE to assist improvement of review work 
RE provides a frame which illuminates how reviewers reach a balanced judgement. This includes weighing up 
principles and their application - what they mean in the context of ‘cases’; (research applications).  For Rawls, 
principles and cases have a reciprocal relationship in that principles provide guidance whilst cases provide an 
opportunity for application and considered judgements, refining principles and making them relevant to 
individual, complex cases. In ethics review, principles inform and guide procedures. Reviewers must balance 
overarching principles of autonomy, justice, harm and benefit ratios with research applications) which require a 
decision. Ultimately, reviewers are not simply involved in matching applications with procedure but use their 
own subjective judgements balancing these with what is permissible. The pace of meetings and the practical 
need for decision-making means that there is little space for reflection. However, outside of meetings in 
interviews, reviewers demonstrated the ability to reflect on what they did.  
 
Procedures in digital and paper form are imbued with ethical principles. Reviewers are tasked with applying 
abstract concepts which are only generally defined in regulations and other foundational documents [36]. For 
Savulescu, subjective interpretation and context mean that absolute consistency is impossible to achieve. In 
response to the question of what RECs should do, he states: ‘The best answer I have found is reflective 





intuitions’. (23 p.493).  This article goes some way to providing evidence that RE does in fact closely describe the 
decision-making process. RE (In this article) is suggested as a frame to (i) show that this closely describes what 
reviewers do and, (ii) proposed as a helpful frame to illuminate work for reviewers carrying the potential for 
improving and developing review work. 
 
Moral deliberation of the kind that happens in RECs is a crucial part of decision-making. Research on 
observations of RECs in France, Germany and the UK highlighted that committee discussions were grounded in 
the particularities of the case considering design, quality of information and relevance of the study rather than 
using normative principles. This included reviewers bringing their own experience and backgrounds to bear on 
discussions [21]. The use of such tacit means of decision-making needs to be examined so that processes can be 
scrutinised, and reviewers can access their established practices and scrutinise them. One of the criticisms of RE 
as a method is that it seemingly affords credibility to intuitions (and other tacit responses or reactions to ethical 
questions). This acceptance can undermine the credibility of any debate (or subsequent decisions) because 
existing prejudices may be reinforced or reproduce moral conservatism [1].  Overarching principles in 
themselves do not dictate one’s moral decision making and reasoning about problems though they may play a 
part in that reasoning. The RE frame presents opportunities for reviewers to examine the tacit, unconscious, 
intuitive, emotional and imaginative aspects of their practice which they use to reconcile the prescribed principle 
and procedural direction of review work. Ethics review is saturated with procedure and bureaucratic 
requirements. However, RECs could not accomplish their regulatory function if review work consisted solely of 
reference to abstract, principle -informed requirements and evaluating adherence to procedure. In fact, 
reviewers engage in deliberations which are often only tangentially connected to abstracted procedures. 
Decision making was situated, concrete (in the here and now and familiar) and practical (making sense, as far as 
possible, of prospective research). The strength of the study reported on in this article is that it starts with review 
work, engaging reviewers and what they say about their work as well as using observations of meetings. It 
reveals how RE closely describes reviewers’ work and explains how RE as a conceptual frame can be used to 
provoke a reflexive approach to development of RECs through training. There are limitations in this analysis.  
The perspectives of participants in research are not addressed directly and are obscured here as they generally 
are in the critiques of ethics review. Participants are rendered passive, remote from decision-making and denied 
agency. A serious consequence of institutionalised ethics review with its inherent authority and power is that 
‘vulnerable’ research participants are rendered more vulnerable because of their construction as passive players 
and the potential for researchers to avoid research with such groups because of the bureaucratic hurdles [37]. 
This should be a concern for all of us as potential researchers and participants in research. However, this article 
has contributed to the ongoing debate about RECs. It has shown how RE might extend our knowledge of RECs 
as working authoritative bodies. The illumination of processes and actual review work is particularly important 
in bureaucracies which generally privilege audit (outcomes) over process.  
The connection between RE and reflexivity  
 RE as a method has wide application and is used in bioethics and clinical ethics broadly as a way of thinking 





through examination of intentions, obligations, and moral duties. These intentions, obligations and feelings of 
duty are apparent in reviewers’ work and are used tacitly in reaching decisions. Reviewers’ training could be 
enhanced by examining what motivates their decision-making including scrutinising the intuitions, emotions and 
imaginative processes at work, then examining how these fit with intentions, moral duties, and obligations. 
Balancing of obligation and feeling characterises RE as a method. The claim here is that RE closely describes what 
actually happens and can provide a useful tool for training.  Reflexive analysis is a way of examining and 
evaluating how this ‘to and fro’ activity works in decision-making processes.  
 
Training for the practical improvement of ethics review 
Current debates dichotomise the purpose and practice of formal ethics review into what they should do: adhere 
to codes or reflectively deliberate and suggest professionalisation because of the knowledge and skill required 
[22,23,24]. Findings illustrate that reviewers already possess knowledge and skills as well as reflective abilities. 
What is significant for the development and improvement of ethics review is that those involved have the 
reflexive space to consider their work. However, reflexivity is challenging in practice. 
Practical reflexivity in organisations means to both examine habitual ways of seeing the worlds and thought and 
behaviour acquired from authoritative sources and evaluate ‘consolidated habits of perceiving, thinking, 
remembering, resolving problems and feeling’ (38 p. 1351]. The findings in this study revealed a range of 
responses and tacit strategies to review. Introducing reflexive approaches in training could help in evaluating 
and reviewing, existing practices but to enhance practices, reviewers would first have to access what they do in 
the world of everyday work. This is demanding and difficult because processes are so embedded. RE could be 





Much empirical research on ethics review is retrospective in that it examines decisions resulting from review 
rather than exploring review practice itself. The research findings reported on here use data derived from the 
work of review (observations) and interviews (with reviewers about their work).  
RECs’ performance would benefit from a more reflexive approach in training instead of a focus on legal and 
procedural requirements. Regulatory review systems are well established and unlikely to disappear, though 
they can evolve and change. Support and training offered, seems to offer few opportunities for REC 
communities to reflect on their work. Whether reviewing prospective research in health or social care, a 
reflexive approach to decision-making is required. 
Reviewers do not need training to become more familiar with procedures. Meaningful development must start 





method in reaching decisions. If (as has been argued) their reflective expertise is to be improved when making 
normative or ethical judgements [23], then the nature of training itself is important. 
 Reflexivity in learning is challenging because it requires an unearthing of what is done in the everyday to 
accomplish tasks and this is tacit and not brought out into the open. RE has been used as a frame to interpret 
work processes. It can also potentially be used as a conceptual tool for reviewers to consider how decisions are 
made. This kind of reflexive analysis of review work is needed but alongside this, the nature of training is 
important if ethics review work is to evolve and improve. Practical reflexive approaches view learning as 
embodied and existential considering both how we feel and how we respond to others [38]. Enhanced training 
would therefore involve researchers and participants as well as reviewers in learning and research communities. 
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